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AIR CARRIER LIABILITY UNDER WARSAW: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL'S
FAILURE TO ACT IN THE FACE OF KNOWN RISK IS AN
"ACCIDENT" WHEN DETERMINING WARSAW LIABILITY
- HUSAIN v. OLYMPIC ARWAYS
ANN CORNETr
C OURTS HAVE HAD to grapple with the scope of the defini-
tion of "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion2 after the seminal case of Air France v. Saks.' In Saks, the
Supreme Court rejected a broad interpretation by the Ninth
Circuit to characterize an "accident" under the Warsaw Conven-
tion as an "occurrence associated with the operation of aircraft
which takes place between the time any person boards . . . and
all such persons have disembarked"4 and instead defined it as an
"unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to
the passenger. ' 5 While the Court excluded injuries resulting
"from the passenger's own internal reaction to the usual, nor-
mal and expected operation of the aircraft, '"6 questions re-
mained as to whether Warsaw liability exists where the air carrier
aggravated or caused injury to a passenger through its own ac-
tion or inaction.7
I Candidate for J.D., May 2003, Southern Methodist University School of Law;
B.A., Earth System Sciences, 1999, Cornell University. The author wishes to
express her gratitude to her family for their love and support.
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
3 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); see also Harakas, AndrewJ. & John
Maggio, Sacking Saks: Transformation of the "Accident" Requirement, Warsaw Conven-
tion Article 17, 15 AIR & SPACE LAw. 8 (2001) (hereinafter Sacking Saks) (discuss-
ing evolution of Article 17 accident interpretation).
4 Saks v. Air France, 724 F.2d 1383, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984).
5 Saks, 470 U.S. at 405.
6 Id. at 406.
7 See McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (S.D.
Fla. 1999) (finding a dissolution of the airline's duty of care to render or obtain
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In Husain v. Olympic Airways", the Ninth Circuit answers this
question. Husain departs from previous caselaw9 by finding that
the crew's inaction in responding to a known risk to a passenger
constitutes an "accident" under Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention where the crew could act to minimize the risk without
unreasonably interfering with the normal operation of the air-
craft.' In light of previous Supreme Court interpretation of
Warsaw, this interpretation is necessary so as not to completely
eliminate any duty of care of the airline to passengers with pre-
existing conditions. However, Husain also imposes strict ele-
ments for such recovery.
During an Olympic Airways flight from Athens to the New
York, Dr. Abid Hanson, his wife Rubina Husain, and their chil-
dren ("Plaintiffs") discovered that they were seated in the non-
smoking section of the airplane only three rows in front of the
non-partitioned smoking section." Dr. Hanson was an asth-
matic who had been suffering from breathing problems prior to
boarding the plane. Upon locating their seats, Plaintiffs asked
the flight crew to move Dr. Hanson for the duration of the flight
to a seat farther away from the smoking section due to his
asthma and were refused.
As soon as the flight began, ambient smoke from the smoking
section surrounded the Plaintiffs. 2 Ms. Husain sought out the
flight attendant and requested to move Dr. Hanson to a seat
medical aid if the cause of the passenger's initial injury is internal to the
passenger).
Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2002).
9 See Saks, 470 U.S. at 406; Abramson v. Japan Air Lines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 133
(3d Cir. 1984) (holding that "aggravation of a pre-existing injury during the
course of a routine and normal flight should not be considered an "accident"
within the meaning of Article 17"); Krys, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1999) (refusing
to extend accident to aggravation of a preexisting condition due to crew negli-
gence in failing to divert plane); McDowell v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 54 F.
Supp. 2d 1313 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (following Krys); Tandon v. United Air Lines, 926
F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding failure to provide adequate medical care to
passengers not an accident under Warsaw). But see Patel v. Air Canada, No. 00-
02168 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2000) (refusing to dismiss action where crew refused
to provide medical services); Seguritan v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 446 N.Y.S.2d
397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (pre-Saks decision finding failure to provide adequate
medical care is an accident).
10 Husain, 316 F.3d at 837.
1 Id. at 833. Plaintiffs had presented to the check-in agent a letter from Dr.
Hanson's brother, also a doctor, alerting the airline to his condition. They also




HUSAIN v. OLYMPIC AIRWAYS
farther away from the smoking section. The flight attendant
told Plaintiffs that Dr. Hanson could switch seats with another
passenger, but to do so, Dr. Hanson or Ms. Husain would have
to ask other passengers themselves and without the aid of the
flight crew.13 Dr. Hanson's breathing problems worsened, and
after the meal service, Dr. Hanson walked towards the front of
the cabin in an attempt to get away from the smoke.14 Dr. Han-
son then suffered an asthma attack, and despite the assistance by
other passengers and the crew, he died.
Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death suit under the liability provi-
sions of the Warsaw Convention in state court on December 24,
1998, and Olympic removed the case to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California on March 23,
1999.15 Plaintiffs argued that three different scenarios of their
trip constituted an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention:
(1) the refusals of the flight crew to move Dr. Hanson; (2) the
flight crew's inability to provide oxygen in time; and (3) the fail-
ure of the captain to turn on the non-smoking signs during Dr.
Hanson's attack. 6 Defendants argued that none of these events
constituted an "unexpected or unusual event" during the flight
to trigger Article 17 liability under Saks. 17 Judge Breyer con-
cluded that the "unexpected or unusual" event was the attend-
ant's violation of the recognized standard of care for flight
attendants on international flights and the violation of
Olympic's policy to move sick passengers if helpful and to alert
the chief cabin attendant of the medical requests."' Accord-
ingly, the trial judge, in a non-jury trial, awarded $1,400,000 in
damages to Plaintiffs, reduced that award by 50% due to Dr.
Hanson's comparative negligence, and awarded an additional
$700,000 in non-pecuniary damages.' 9
Olympic appealed the findings of the district court, arguing
that Dr. Hanson's death resulted from his own internal reac-
tions and as such, was precluded by the standard set by the Su-
13 Unknown to Plaintiffs, the flight contained eleven empty passenger seats
and carried 28 non-revenue passengers Id. A "non-revenue passenger" is an em-
ployee or relative of an employee of the airline and typically pays nothing or a
discounted fare to fly. See Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126
(N.D. Cal. 2000).
14 Husain, 316 F.3d at 834.
'5 Husain, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
16 Id. at 1131.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1133.
'9 Husain, 316 F.3d at 832.
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preme Court in Saks.2" In reviewing the district court's findings
of fact and law for clear error, the Ninth Circuit first looked to
Saks in determining whether an accident had occurred under
Article 17.21
The Court in Saks looked to the original French text of the
Convention and to French legal meaning for the original intent
of the drafters of the Convention. 22 The Court found two provi-
sions of both the French and English versions of the Convention
important: first, that Article 17 assigns carrier liability for death
or personal injury when there is an accident, while Article 18
finds liability for checked baggage when there is an incident;, sec-
ond, that implicit in Article 17 is the necessary requirement that
the accident have caused the injury.23 The court noted that the
Warsaw drafters' requirement of a showing of an accident for
personal injuries as opposed to an occurrence for baggage must
have meant to distinguish the two. 24 Secondly, the Court noted
that there is an element of causation involved, and that this
cause of the injury must satisfy the definition of accident and
20 Id. at 836.
21 Id. at 835. In its entirety, Article 17 states:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suf-
fered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 3, art. 17.
22 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396-400 (1985). The original French text
of Article 17 states:
Le transporteur est responsible du dommage survenu en cas de moot, de
blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
l'accident qui a cause le dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef ou au
cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de debarquement.
Id. at 398 n.2.
23 Id. at 398.
24 Id. The court looked to the text of Article 17 and the historical interpreta-
tion of the term and determined that the term "accident" could include several
different meanings:
The word "accident" is not a technical legal term with a clearly de-
fined meaning... [A]n accident means any unintended and unex-
pected occurrence which produces hurt or loss. But it is often used
to denote any unintended and unexpected loss or hurt apart from
its cause; and if the cause is not known the loss or hurt itself would
certainly be called an accident. The word "accident" is also used to
denote both the cause and the effect, no attempt being made to
discriminate between them.
Id. (quoting Fenton v.J. Thorley & Co., A.C. 443, 453 (1903)).
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not the occurrence of an injury by itself.25 Thus, the Saks Court
held that Warsaw liability under Article 17 could only arise
where there is an unusual or unexpected event or happening
external to the passenger which caused the injury. 26
Despite the causal requirement that the Saks court imposed
on the term "accident", determining whether an "accident" oc-
curred under Article 17 is a fact-specific inquiry requiring a flex-
ible assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the
injury.2 7 In Husain, the court found that the flight personnel
"(1) violated the recognized standard of care for flight attend-
ants on international flights by refusing to assist; (2) violated
Olympic's policy; and (3) failed to alert the chief cabin attend-
ant or another flight attendant to help Dr. Hanson find another
seat."' 28 The court determined that the flight crew's actions went
beyond a mere negligence standard, as the personnel in charge
knew of the potential danger to Dr. Hanson. Thus, the court has
assigned an important duty to the carrier under Article 17:
where a crew can assist a passenger suffering from a pre-existing
condition, it must or such omission renders the carrier liable
where it could have taken reasonable steps to prevent aggrava-
tion of the condition.29
Notice of such pre-existing injury by the carrier is implicit in
this threshold. The court distinguished its holding from those
in two similar aggravating injury flight cases, Abramson v. Japan
Airlines Co.3" and Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines.3 In Abram-
25 Id. In distinguishing between the many different interpretations of "acci-
dent", the Saks Court concluded that the drafters of Article 17 meant to require a
causal element to the term and not simply allow recovery where accidental dam-
ages occurred.
The text of the Convention thus implies that, however we define
"accident," it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the defini-
tion rather than the occurrence of the injury alone. American ju-
risprudence has long recognized this distinction between an
accident that is the cause of an injury and an injury that is itself an
accident.
Id.
26 Id. at 405.
27 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002).
28 Id.
29 This interpretation is consistent with the original intent of the Warsaw Con-
vention, which was to impose liability for accidents only when the carrier had not
taken reasonable measures to prevent the injury. Saks, 470 U.S. at 401 (citing
Report of the Second Session, International Technical Commiittee of Legal Ex-
perts on Air Questions (1927); Report of the Third Session, International Tech-
nical Committee of Legal Experts on Air Questions (1928)).
3o Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984).
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son, the complainant suffered from a pre-existing condition
which had begun to bother him while on board a Japan Airlines
flight.2 Abramson's wife asked the flight crew to clear several
seats so he could lie down to apply a self-help remedy. The
flight crew claimed that there were no empty seats.3 3 In actual-
ity, seats were open in first class. In Krys, the complainant felt ill
early into a flight.34 A doctor on board tended to Krys and in-
formed the crew that there was no urgent medical need. The
doctor determined that Krys had most likely suffered a heart at-
tack, and Krys filed suit arguing that the airline was negligent in
aggravating his condition 5.3  The Husain court distinguished
these cases by noting that in both cases, the crew was unaware of
either a pre-existing medical condition or a need for immediate
action 6.3  Besides the issue of notice of the injury, the Husain
court further required that "reasonable alternatives exist that
would substantially minimize the risk and implementing these
alternatives would not unreasonably interfere with the normal,
expected operation of the airplane. 37
This analysis is particularly important after El Al Israel Airlines,
Inc. v. Tseng,38 where the Supreme Court held that personal in-
juries suffered when embarking, disembarking, or on board an
aircraft are solely recoverable under Article 17.39 Relying on
Tseng, courts have found negligence, civil rights violations, defa-
mation, assault, and battery preempted under federal statutory
law.40 To find in Husain that the airline was not liable at all for
an intentional act knowingly committed by its crew which re-
sulted a passenger's death would completely rid the airline of
any duty of care to its passengers.4 Such a result could not have
been the intention of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention.
31 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997).
32 Abramson, 739 F.2d at 131.
33 Id.
34 Kys, 119 F.3d at 1517.
35 Id.
36 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2002).
37 Id.
38 El Al Israel Airlines, Inc. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
39 Id. at 161.
40 See Tory A. Weigand, Accident, Exclusivity, and Passenger Disturbances under the
Warsaw Convention, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 891, 932 (2001).
41 See id. at 953-55. The court reasoned that with the preemption of state law
causes of action, the carrier's standard of care to its passengers would be unrea-
sonably minimal in allowing a carrier the defense of nonaction:
The result of the union of Krys and Tseng is a dissolution of an
airline's duty of care to its passengers so long as the cause of a pas-
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Commentators concerned with the Husain court's broadening
of the scope of the term "accident" cite the apparent litigation
floodgates that would open with respect to issues such as deep-
vein thrombosis ("economy class syndrome"). 42 These commen-
tators fail to distinguish between injuries that arise completely
independent to any action or inaction of the crew or unusual
operation of the plane and those that arise from complete disre-
gard of the passengers by the airline. These commentators fail
to realize that Husain is specifically limited to a small class of
potential plaintiffs as it imposes strict limitations on recovery. It
is solely limited to cases where the aircraft personnel 1) are on
notice of the pre-existing condition; 2) can reasonably do some-
thing to aid in the situation that will not interfere with the nor-
mal operations of the flight; and 3) do nothing. By meeting
these elements, the carrier has become the "unexpected or unu-
sual happening that is external to the passenger" that Saks con-
templated. Application of the holding in Husain will not result
in a torrential flood of prospective litigants, rather it will en-
courage carriers to take an active role in preventing and assist-
ing passengers who it can help.
senger's initial injury is internal to the passenger himself. This
holds true so long as the airline takes no affirmative action which
aggravates the injury. Complete inaction is acceptable, even if in
doing nothing the airline aggravates the passenger's injury.
Id. (quoting McDowell v. Continental Airlines, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320 (S.D.
Fla. 1999)).
42 See Sacking Saks, supra note 3, at 10 ("It has been consistently recognized
that an injury or death caused by an internal reaction or an aggravation of a
preexisting condition during a normal and routine flight is not actionable. How-
ever, this may no longer be the case under the new judicial attitude toward the
definition of 'accident."').
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